讲座题目：Information Design for Social Learning with Patient Agents
主讲嘉宾：吕辰（北京大学汇丰商公司 助理教授）
学科方向：信息经济学
讲座时间：2025年10月28日（周二）上午10:00
讲座地点：永利3044noc402室
摘要：
Sequentially coming agents may adopt a new technology. Early adoption can generate information about its value, which is either high or low, and an intermediary decides how such information will be dynamically published. Because individuals tend to wait and free-ride on information generated by others, efficient social learning is hard to achieve. Facing this challenge, we study how the intermediary can improve social welfare by designing its information publishing policy. To incentivize early adoption, we show it is optimal to restrain future information flow via inducing individually sub-optimal adoption but not via excessive waiting. The optimal design features a simple threshold stopping structure: in every period, recommend adoption if the intermediary’s current belief is more optimistic than a threshold; otherwise, recommend waiting forever. While the first-best design uses a constant threshold, the optimal design features time-varying thresholds that typically cross the first-best one. We also examine special cases where learning is via conclusive news. In good-news environments, the optimal design needs to involve a middle phase in which exploration is randomly terminated; in bad-news environments, adoption may be continued even if bad news has arrived. These serve to mitigate the individuals’ incentive problem efficiently.
嘉宾介绍：
现为北京大学汇丰商公司助理教授。主要从事信息经济学相关的应用微观理论研究，重点关注信息设计及其在产业组织、平台设计等方面的应用。有研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory。
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